Who gives innate gifts? Cognitive and cultural approaches to Turkic South Siberian shamanism by Stépanoff, Charles
WHO GIVES INNATE GIFTS? 
COGNITIVE AND CULTURAL APPROACHES TO 
TURKIC SOUTH SIBERIAN SHAMANISM
Charles Stépanoff 
École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris
Amongst Turkic South Siberian peoples, laypeople often perform little ordi-
nary rituals, such as making libations accompanied by relatively fixed invocations. 
Nevertheless there are some ritual actions that only certain individuals are supposed 
to carry out successfully. One assumes that a layman who performs an act reserved for 
a shaman does so at the risk of death. Although the boundary between these two kinds 
of actions is strictly enforced, the position of a specific action from one or another side 
of the boundary can vary from informant to informant.
On what basis is the shaman’s mokhamnopoly on certain actions premised? What 
role do representations of the origins of his skill have to play in this context? To answer 
these questions, the ethnographer cannot refer to a local code of explicit rules describ-
ing how to become a shaman and how to be recognized as such. There are no such 
rules: in South Siberia people do not actively decide who will become a shaman, merely 
because they think that one cannot become a shaman. Local conceptions of shamans and 
their characteristics, rather than being expressed in explicit rule-based form, take the 
form of descriptions of rituals, concrete histories of individual cases, autobiographies of 
shamans, legends about ancestors, and myths concerning “the first shaman.” 
What tacit theory might be said to support these narratives? Two different 
patterns emerge, yet they seem hardly reconcilable. On the one hand, members of the 
shamans’ category are frequently thought to possess certain bodily peculiarities that 
refer to the idea of an inherited underlying feature. According to such an essentialist 
view, the shamans’ category can be compared with a biological species. This pattern 
has not been developed in classical theoretical literature about shamanism but it is well 
known in cognitive anthropology and is consistent with new research in social psychol-
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ogy. The conception of the shaman from this point of view expresses the principles of 
a cross-cultural, perhaps universal, specialized cognitive device.
On the other hand, quite often narratives connect shamans’ power not with a 
special intrinsic feature, but with an enduring or temporary relationship with one 
or more special agents, such as spirits. The shaman’s skill appears here as a favour 
or a “gift” from outside. The literature on Siberian shamanism has richly illustrated 
and analyzed this pattern. Much of this literature may be said to take an ‘interpre-
tive’ approach, because it is based on gathering and interpreting explicit discourses 
of informants. This interpretation stresses that shamans are not, for locals, samples 
of a isolated category but relational entities included in a signifying system (a whole 
“culture” or “native conceptualization of the world”) with other social and non-human 
categories. In this way the local representation of the category of shamans cannot be 
correctly described in essentialist terms. 
In this article, I will apply both an essentialist and interpretive point of view to 
explore the extent to which these are relevant for the analysis of the concrete Turkic 
South Siberian case. I will argue that shamans are understood with a specific essential-
ism which is contradictory with the biological species model. Ethnographic material 
will be taken from literature about North and South Altaian, Khakass, Shors and from 
my fieldwork in Tuva. This question of the origin of a special skill is related to notions 
of innateness, of nature and of intentionality. In the West, a natural feature is assumed 
to be caused by bio-physiological processes, i.e. non-intentionally, such as eye colour, 
the possession of a congenital disease or, an innate gift, like an exceptional memory 
or musical capacity. But in the latter cases, the use of the word “gift” suggests that 
our conception is not so clear and that our naturalism hides some cultural mytholo-
gies. How may a gift be given “non-intentionally”? Who is the giver that gives innate 
“gifts”? If the notion of “gift” is a testimony of a Christian worldview, does it mean 
that in Christians societies, causal processes are understood as intentional ones (e.g. “the 
divine will”)? In this case, the intuitive opposition between natural facts and intentional 
ones would not be relevant for believers. One would hardly agree with this.
This example shows that the essentialist pattern and the relational pattern includ-
ing an external intentionality can be intermingled. In the Altai-Saian shamanic case, 
it is not likely that one pattern can be reduced to the other. I will argue that not one 
of the theses patterns can be entirely rejected (e.g. for being only an “explicit theory”), 
it means that both cognitive and interpretative theories are on their point right, but 
insufficient to describe the whole. They are not only concurrent theories in anthro-
pology: they express two points of view which arise for the locals themselves. The 
apparent contradiction can be resolved by a pragmatic approach taking into account 
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the enunciation contexts and different speech registers in which these models are 
implemented.
Shamans as species members 
Natural kinds and biological species
The philosophical concept of “natural kind” received in the 1970s a great deal of 
interest after Quine’s study, which emphasized its importance in language learning, in 
induction statements and generally in the human mind (1969). A natural kind, accord-
ing to Quine, is a non-arbitrary ensemble that is founded in nature. Quine suggested 
that the human attitude to identify natural kinds and to make correct inductions about 
their members is a result of natural selection. Putnam (1975) proposed a new theory 
of semantics in which he argued that natural kind terms refer directly to real referents. 
This anti-nominalist interpretation requires a realist definition of kinds. According to 
these authors an ensemble is a natural kind only if its members naturally share func-
tional properties, which are causally determined by an identical underlying structure. 
However, the identification of the typical properties of any given being is not sufficient 
to classify it as a member of a kind, because “appearances may be misleading”. Thus 
scientific expertise may lead people to reject “fools’ gold” from the category of gold 
even if it looks very similar. Moreover, visible characteristics are not necessary condi-
tions for category membership: a kind may have abnormal members or states. For 
example, gold in its gaseous state is still gold and a three-legged tiger is still classified 
as a tiger. The stereotypical properties are related to an “ … ‘essential nature’ which 
the thing shares with other members of the natural kind” (Putnam 1975: 140). Thus 
one can say that the use of a natural kind term conveys a theory about this kind. It is 
not necessary to know in what consists the ‘essential nature’ in order to use the word. 
It is the task of the scientific investigation to determine the chemical atomic structure 
of gold. Putnam included also amongst natural kinds biological species, proposing 
‘chromosome structure’ as their ‘essential nature’. However, some biologists and epis-
temologists rejected this inclusion because, they argue, chromosome structures are not 
really “essential” for any biological species. Indeed, a genuine essential trait should 
occur in all specimens of the species and only in them. Such a stability and discreetness 
obviously contradicts the hypothesis of the evolution of species, according to which, 
on the one hand, mutations cause continuous differentiation between the members of 
species and, on the other hand, variations between different species are just the result 
of historically situated processes. 
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Thus, at an ontological level, biological species are not natural kinds because they 
lack an essence. Ghiselin (1974) argued that it is more relevant to consider a species as 
an individual, determined not by a chromosome pool, but by a particular and continu-
ous history in the evolution. Cognitive psychologists, too, have been interested in the 
status of biological species: not in their real ontological status but in the way they 
are understood by laypeople. Psychologists found that the cluster of representations 
and intuitive theories that drive laypeople’s judgements, termed ‘naïve biology’ or 
‘folk biology’, are quite contrary to scientific and evolutionist biology: Folk biology is 
frankly essentialist.
For example, Simons and Keil (1995) observed that children believe that animals 
of the same species have an identical inner anatomy. Children develop such beliefs 
prior to and independently of educational or experiential inputs. Likewise, beliefs 
concerning the behaviour observed in an animal sample, for example eating habits, are 
thought to be characteristic of all members of its species (Atran 1990). Such induc-
tions are not found in the judgments about artefacts, something which suggests an 
ontological distinction between the domain for Natural Kinds and Artefacts. The 
conclusion is that children understand members of species to be specimens of a natural 
kind, that share a common underlying feature which produces identical characteristics. 
Nevertheless, children do not appear to have precise theories as to the nature of such 
an underlying feature.
The essentialist categorization of biological species is assumed by some theorists 
to be a universal phenomenon, a “habit of the mind” (Atran 1998), and psychologi-
cal tests conducted in non-Western countries have further attempted to confirm this 
theory (Diesendruck 2001). Thus, it is thought that such an intuitive ontology of folk 
biology will necessarily constrain, positively or negatively, every cultural construction 
acquired later by children. 
Ritual specialists as a “social species”
Boyer proposes that some social categories, especially of the religious specialists, are 
often interpreted according to an essentialist pattern (Boyer 1990, 1993, 1994, 2001). 
Inspired by Putnam’s theory (Boyer 1990: 123, n.11), he comments that typical char-
acteristics are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for membership in a category, 
something which implies that there should be an underlying criterion. According to 
Boyer (1990: 104-105), “… there is a presumption that persons occupying a certain 
position share an essence (…)”. He goes on to explain that “The assumptions of shared 
essence and typical features seem to be a direct translation, in the domain of traditional 
interaction, of the way everyone from early childhood identifies and classifies natural 
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kinds”, or as he says above, “living kinds”. Indeed, people have a tendency to assume 
that ritual specialists have this role, not only because they have been instituted by the 
society, but because they have hidden and invisible features. This idea was developed 
later by social psychologists Rothbart and Taylor (1992). 
Boyer developed his analysis in The naturalness of religious ideas where he maintains 
that social categories are not only perceived as natural kinds but precisely as biological 
species. Boyer concludes that such categories are understood as “pseudo-natural kinds” 
and can be called “social species.” He gives the example of the beyem, different ritual 
specialists among the Fang in Gabon. To be recognized as a beyem, the practice of a 
typical activity is neither necessary nor sufficient. The membership to the category is 
related to the possession of an invisible special capacity called evur, which is sometimes 
described as a hidden organ. Hence Boyer claims that the different essentialist repre-
sentations, whether they refer to biological species or social categories, share common 
core principles. He also comments on the absence in intuitive sociology of additional 
expectations, specific to folk biology, like a strict link between the membership in a 
category with the origin of the members (a cat is a descendant of cat).
Essentialized shamans
In Altai-Saian, the hypothesis that people hold an essentialist conception of ritual 
specialists is consistently supported by the empirical evidence: People make frequent 
distinctions between “genuine” and “false” shamans; they cite the shaman’s physical 
particularities such as a specific illness, attributed to shamans; there is an absence of 
initiation and a hereditary mode of transmission of the ‘shamanic gift’. Such state-
ments and beliefs seem to present an understanding of shamans as individuals who 
have been struck by a genetic illness, or as members of a peculiar species, who are in 
either case biologically distinctive individuals.
Moreover, it is almost impossible to point out any observable feature that would be 
considered by Altai-Saian people as absolutely necessary and sufficient for an individ-
ual to be a member of the category “shaman”. Obviously, there is a common definition 
of the word “shaman” (kham): a Tuvan who was concerned that I had not understood 
the meaning of the word kham explained it as such: “a man with a shamanic drum” 
(düŋgürlüg kizhi). But, in fact, this criterion is never considered by Tuvans as absolutely 
convincing. Many shamans in Siberia, especially in during the Soviet period, but also 
earlier, did not wear a ritual costume and used a Jew’s harp or even, in Tuva, an acacia 
branch in place of a drum. Conversely, the criterion given by the current definition is 
not sufficient. Nobody amongst my informants in Tuva would agree that anyone who 
uses a shamanic drum is a “genuine shaman”. Actually, it would be a sign of a strange 
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naiveté, a naiveté that Tuvans observe with regret among the western mystical tourists 
who visit their ‘shamanic centres’. 
This implies that the “genuine” members of the category are thought to hold 
something else, a hidden or special feature. This feature is specific to the category of 
shamans and not characteristic of a wider category including the shamans. In analytical 
term, it can be called the “essence” of shamans. Now, there is no reason to require an 
explicit formulation of this notion in Turkic languages. An essentialist scheme is not 
necessarily based on a discourse about an essence: for instance, essentialisms concerning 
women or ethnic minorities are not expressed in statements about what kind of object 
is their “essence”, nor in terms of a causal power that may explain the behaviour or the 
situation of these social groups. As a rule, the bases of these types of hypotheses remain 
vague. It is rarely the case that explicit theories are formulated and widely shared, such 
as the idea of “blue blood”, which gave the ‘aristocratic essence’ a biological image and 
physically explained the difference between gentlemen and commoners.
Among Siberian-Turkic peoples, in certain situations one may say that a genuine 
shaman has an uk, a word which means in non-shamanic context: “origin; kind; descent 
group”. The notion uktug kham “shaman with uk” can be translated, in this context, as 
“hereditary shaman” in contrast with uk chok kham that is “shaman without origin”, 
or as “genuine shaman” in contrast to mege kham “false shaman”. But it is mostly in 
assumptions about the shamanic body that we find concrete instantiations of the idea 
of an essence.
Physical properties and sensory faculties
Very often legends and reputation attribute physical peculiarities to great shamans. 
A Tuvan girl in the city of Kyzyl told me that her great-grandfather was a famous 
shaman: “He had a breast at the level of the abdomen on the left. People sucked it but 
he didn’t give milk.” For the girl, this third breast was the sign of the authenticity 
of his quality. But she did not agree that it is necessary and sufficient to have a third 
breast to be a genuine shaman. 
More often, a better actualisation of the idea of essence is an unobservable physical 
feature. There is widespread consensus among Siberian-Turkic peoples that shamans’ 
skeleton is of a special nature. A Tuvan shaman said to me that he had “white bones” 
(ak sööktüg men). The idea that shamans have different bones, called “white” (ak) or 
“pure” (aryg), is very common in the accounts collected by Kenin-Lopsan in Soviet 
times (Kenin-Lopsan 2002). People who do not have “white bones” are called “simple 
people” (bödüün kizhi) or “black people” (kara kizhi). Among other Siberian Turkic 
peoples, the shaman’s skeleton is special not through its nature but thanks to an 
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unusual element that is called the “superfluous bone” (artyg söök). Khlopina, who 
worked amongst the Shors in 1927, noted that Shors expected shamans to have a 
tubercle on the toe or on the arm (Khlopina 1978: 77). Among the neighbouring 
population of Kumandins, Potapov heard that a shaman possessed an additional tooth 
(Potapov 1947: 166). All these abnormal outgrowths were seen as indicators of the 
presence of the “superfluous bone”. A contemporary Khakass shaman said to me that 
he had a “superfluous bone” which had been found by radiography in his thorax.
When you ask a Tuvan shaman when he became a shaman, his answer usually is: 
“I didn’t become a shaman, I was born like that”, followed by a story of his childhood. 
This kind of narrative constitutes a specific genre, the structure of which is common to 
all Altai-Saian peoples. Physical anomalies and peculiar behaviour are remarked by the 
family in the early childhood, or even before the birth. For example, Tuvans sometimes 
think that a child who strongly fidgets in his mother’s womb has a shamanic destiny. 
However, none of these signs is sufficient to identify a “genuine shaman”. When the 
child becomes able to speak, he enters into what is thought of as a second stage 
where the child is expected to show special faculties. As an old Tuvan from Tere-Xöl 
explained to me concerning how to discern a child-shaman: “It’s visible [köstü bêêr]. A 
clever man recognizes the signs. For example, the child says that you shouldn’t go and 
actually you shouldn’t. If you go, you die. These children are like this.” Such a child 
is supposed to see the future and the spirits, as Tuvans say “he can see what simple 
people cannot see.” Quite commonly, Tuvan shamans repeated to me: “When I was six, 
I already heard”; “When I was eight, I could see things”. Thus, the physical peculiari-
ties observed in the early childhood serve as support for special sensory faculties. 
A Sagai shaman explained to Diószegi that his additional bone possessed in his 
middle a hole through which he could see and know everything (Diószegi 1998: 30). 
In this case, the additional bone appears as the necessary physical connection between 
the body of the shaman and his special sensory faculties. However, it is striking to note 
that narratives about this stage of instantiation insist on the capacities of the child, 
although the object of his perception remains vague and unnamed. Later, at the time 
of adolescence, these capacities are used in regular contact with special agents, whose 
appearance becomes clear. These agents torment the novice until he agrees to start 
shamanic practice. The family circle may notice this process by the painful crisis the 
novice goes through. He manifests epileptic attacks and depression, flees to the forest, 
or eats metallic objects. Altaian, Shor and Khakass laymen say about such a novice that 
tös bazyp jat “a spirit is crushing him.” 
One finds testimonies about this type of qualifying crisis in the descriptions of 
18th century scientific explorers to Siberia. J.G. Gmelin tells us about the Teleut 
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shaman: “indices from which he is recognized as able for this office are convulsions of 
the body, like our possessed use to do. During his convulsions, he says that God (maybe 
they feared saying to us that the Devil gave him this power) ordained him Priest and 
they believe it.”1 P.S. Pallas reports similar facts about a shaman whom he met among 
the Kachins (Khakass): “a young Kachin magician who, before beginning in this trade, 
had been crazy many years or who pretended to be crazy.”2
Nowadays all Tuvan shamans with whom I spoke said that they went through such 
a crisis. This stability of the phenomenon through at least three centuries is not with-
out a reason. The crisis episode perfectly exemplifies the causal mode of action of the 
shamanic essence. In their autobiographies shamans insist that the shamanic essence 
works through them, and is not a result of their own intentionality. The shaman Kim 
told me that he suffered several crises in his lifetime and, the last time, he knew that 
if he refused to begin the shamanic practice he would die. But what are the laws of 
this necessity? Traditionally, at this stage of the shamanic development, parents call 
for a professional shaman in order to determine by divination whether the teenager 
has a shamanic nature or not. If it is impossible to heal the crisis, it means that this 
phenomenon is not accidental but rather caused by a special nature. If the answer is 
positive, the novice will receive his shamanic paraphernalia. 
A cognatic heredity
To verify if the teenager is a “genuine shaman”, the experienced shaman examines 
whether any of his ancestors were shamans. The spirits who are tormenting him must 
be his ancestors. Indeed, according to the predominant understandings, a shaman is 
necessarily a descendant of another shaman. This begets the question, what are the 
rules of succession to the shamanic status?
Turco-Mongol societies are renowned for being strongly patrilineal. Descent group 
membership and status are inherited exclusively from the father. The succession is based 
on the following principles: patriliny, continuity and, depending on the case, ultimo-
geniture or primogeniture. Consequently, according to Krader “very few relationships 
and still fewer significant ones, are with the maternal kin” (Krader 1963: 321). In this 
context, the shamanic status creates a puzzling exception. For all Turkic peoples and more 
1  “ (...) die Merkmahle, wodurch er zu diesem Amte tüchtig erkannt wird, bestehen in Verstellungen 
des Leibes wie unsere Besessene zu machen pflegen. Er sagt während seinen Verstellungen, dass ihn Gott (vielleicht 
scheueten sie sich vor uns zu sagen, dass der Teufel diese Kraft gebe) zum Priester geordnet habe, und sie glauben es.” 
(1751-1752, I, 275-276). 
2  “(...) eines jungen Katschinzischen Zauberers, der viele Jahre, ehe er das Handwerk angefangen, närrisch 
gewesen order sich närrisch angestellt hatte.” (1771-1776, III (1), 402).
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generally for all Siberian peoples, the individual can inherit shamanic essence through 
men, as well as through women. Thus, studying shamanic genealogies, it is noticeable 
that shamanic quality travels freely from one patrilineal group to another, something 
which is never the case when it comes to other social factors that confer status. In addi-
tion, transmission does not necessarily function from one generation to the next. More 
commonly, the essence skips a generation, or even more. In fact, there are no explicit 
rules of succession for the shaman status: after the death of a shaman, people claim they 
do not know who will succeed him. Lastly, neither elder, nor youngest have any advan-
tage in inheriting the shamanic quality of an ancestor. The fundamental elder/younger 
hierarchy that structures all social relationships is not relevant in shamanic matters. 
The modality of action of the shamanic essence is causal and its transmission is cognatic 
and discontinuous. My claim is that these peculiarities cease being peculiar if one concedes 
that the shamanic status is not conceived as a social status but as a natural feature. ‘Natural’ 
should be understood here by contrast with ‘social’, an opposition which is known among 
Altai-Saian peoples, even if these notions do not always have a direct translation in the 
native languages.3 An equivalent semantic opposition in the Tuvan language can be found 
between chajaatyngan “made as such” and öörengen “learned; trained”. Indeed, even if they 
suppose that a man is socially a stranger to the political or descent groups of his mother, 
Altaians claim that he inherits some physical qualities from his mother and looks like his 
mother’s brother (Tadina 2005). Likewise Khakass and Tuvans informed me that children 
inherit wrestling strength, talents or a propensity for diseases like epilepsy from the mater-
nal side. All these characteristics are contained in the idea of the ‘flesh’ coming from the 
mother, in contrast with the ‘bone’ attributed to the father.
Thus, the category of shaman is not only conceived as a ‘natural kind’ but even 
shares with concepts of biological species the principle that membership depends on 
heredity. Such conceptualisations add an additional element to Boyer’s model; and may 
more precisely be termed genetic essentialism.
Relationship and contingency
The anthropological literature on shamanism of the Siberian area has not hith-
erto emphasized these essentialist aspects in conceptions about shamans. The absence 
of evident explicit notions such as “essence” in native speech probably explains this 
lack of interest. Rather, authors have insisted mostly on a series of themes that seem 
difficult to reconcile with the essentialist pattern. In these narratives, the shaman is 
3  With the exception of words recently borrowed from Mongolian and Russian languages. 
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understood to be a shaman because of his intimate relationship with special agents. 
The meticulous Hungarian ethnographer Vilmos Diószegi, from his inquiry among 
the Sagai (a Khakass group), came to a quite contrary conclusion to the pattern 
proposed above. He says: “To inherit the office of a shaman does not, according to 
Sagai notions, mean an inheritance of shamanistic faculties but that of shaman spirits” 
(1998: 27). From this point of view, the position of the shaman has to be described in 
relational terms rather than in terms of physical or internal properties. Diószegi’s claim 
is consistent with a statement of another great specialist of North Asian shamanism, 
Caroline Humphrey (2003: 261), who contends that “… nothing in this shamanic 
universe was a single indivisible unit”, to such an extent that shaman can be described 
as “a relational being”, “a knot of relationships”. In short, shamans are not defined or 
determined by intrinsic features. 
The Shor shaman Aleksej Shulbaev provides a significant example. In the 1920s, 
he told the Russian ethnographer Dyrenkova that, during the time of his crisis, he 
was visited by a “spirit girl” tös kat. She became his wife in a special marriage ritual 
organized by his patrilateral elders. In this local Shor tradition, the spirit girl is repre-
sented by a newly-made drum and stolen from her father, a man who plays the celestial 
divinity Ülgen. After that ritual the novice can begin his shamanic practice and his 
crisis, usually, stops. 
The theme of the marriage with a spirit is specific to Shor populations, but an 
erotic or at least intimate relation between the shaman and certain special agents 
often appears in all Altai-Saian narratives. The famous Russian ethnographer and 
anthropologist Lev Shternberg (1925), on the basis of examples from different peoples 
of all Siberia and in particular the case of the shaman Aleksej Shulbaev, proposed 
that love for a special agent is the basis of the supposed powers of the shaman, and 
consequently of his authority and social position. It is true that shamans never solely 
explain their powers on the basis of their intrinsic qualities, but rather emphasise the 
help of a complex network of auxiliary special agents. In this sense, when he begins 
the séance, the Shor shaman does not invoke his superfluous bone but his numerous 
helpers. Aleksej Shulbaev had thirteen helpers such as horses, birds, fish and of course 
the “spirit girl”, whom he called “a red girl with seven crests, little girl with three 
eyes” (chetti chalalyp sachyp kys, üsh köstüb kenci kys) (Dyrenkova’s archive quoted by 
Alekseev 1984: 90-91).
In light of such evidence, one wonders whether describing such a relational and 
complex universe in essentialist and naturalist terms would not be an oversimplifica-
tion. Boyer maintains that : “Les personnes censées avoir une capacité particulière pour 
les relations avec les agents surnaturels sont représentées comme ayant une qualité 
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spéciale, quoique invisible, qui les singularise” (2001: 393). Boyer claims that this 
quality, whatever may be its origin, is internal: “dans tous les cas, elle est interne” 
(ibid.). This suggests that a ritual specialist, to whom a connection with external 
special agents is attributed, is in addition necessarily conceived of as possessing special 
inner qualities.
Boyer explains this shift in his earlier work Tradition as truth and communication 
(1990), where he studies why some statements of magicians or initiates (in the case of 
African initiatory societies) are received as true in traditional societies. He argues that 
these statements are not considered true because of the knowledge of the people who 
make them, but because supernatural entities are understood to have a causal action on 
them. Such supernatural action originates in an initiation ritual during which initiates 
are “exposed” to the ancestors’ power. This understanding is a relational one. But not 
every human is judged capable of being involved in causal processes with spirits and 
of being initiated. Special qualities that are personal to the initiate determine access 
to such processes. Thus, the hypothesis of a special causal relationship always involves 
essentialist representations, which are logically anterior to the relational dynamics into 
which the ritual specialist will enter. According to Boyer, “… this in fact is a very 
common strategy in both science and common sense: differences in causal power are 
related to underlying differences in kind” (ibid.: 105). 
This argument concerns societies with initiation rituals, but it can be extended 
to shamanic contexts. Indeed, the choice of the spirit is not random. If a spirit falls 
in love with a man, it implies that the latter possesses an intrinsic quality that can 
seduce the former. And it is usually thought that these qualities are transmitted 
within a shamanic cognatic group. If we read the complete information about the Shor 
shaman Aleksej, published in different places (Dyrenkova 1930, Alekseev 1984, Funk 
2005), we see that he was familiar with the pattern of genetic essentialism. In fact, 
Aleksej claimed to be the descendant of a shaman and this information allows one to 
draw a complete shamanic genealogical schema, very typical for the Altai-Saian area 
(Stépanoff 2007). He lived through a painful crisis during which he saw a white horse, 
which he named his ulug tös ‘main spirit’ and which can be identified as an ancestor. 
The ‘spirit-girl’, a helper spirit, is of secondary importance in his statements and not 
of primary importance as suggested by Shternberg. Thus, the theme of the supernatu-
ral love should be understood as an ornamental elaboration upon the basis of a robust 
genetic essentialist pattern.
However, another question arises: why is there such a consistent emphasis on 
supernatural relationships and alliances in these largely hierarchical societies domi-
nated by hereditary transmission of status and wealth (Hamayon 1990)? Why do 
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we observe in some narratives this necessity to emphasize that the shaman has been 
chosen and loved, as if the essentialist pattern were not completely satisfactory? The 
appearance of this theme is at times quite puzzling: in the 1920s, among the Shor, (a 
rather small population), the Russian ethnographer Khlopina collected information 
that strongly illustrates the idea of a physical and hereditary difference of the shaman 
with ordinary people and does not mention alliances with non-ancestral spirits. Such 
ethnographic evidence supports the essentialist model of cognition. But in the same 
population, during the same period, Dyrenkova heard about shamans loved by ‘spirit 
girls’ and becoming their husbands. Such narratives and indigenous theories thus seem 
to require a more holistic cultural interpretation. 
Does it mean that two heterogeneous traditions coexist among the Shor popula-
tion? This hypothesis is not probable, because we find the very same divergence in 
sources concerning other Turkic peoples of the region. In this matter, it is necessary to 
take a pragmatic point of view on the question. My assumption is that these different 
themes are not the expression of different religious traditions but of contrasting speech 
registers. There is a speech register typical of shamans with its style, its tone. The 
essentialist point of view is an external one and usually it is supported by non-shaman 
informants, or laymen. On the other hand, the dramatic narratives involving spirits are 
characteristic of shamans’ speech practices about their own experience. The difference 
between Khlopina and Dyrenkova’s work is due to the fact that the former collected 
information from laymen and the latter from shamans. In my fieldwork in Tuva, I 
noted the same divergence between types of informants. In 2006, Sveltana, a 50 years 
old woman living in Kyzyl spoke to me about a young girl in the countryside who had 
recently acquired a ritual costume, something which actualises access to the shamanic 
function. Svetlana gave me two arguments that, according to her, indicated that the 
girl was a “genuine shaman”: she had special perceptive faculties and violent epileptic 
fits. This description of a shamanic crisis as a kind of disease or madness that works 
as a causal phenomenon, is typical from the point of view of an external observer. A 
Yakut shaman remarked: “for those who surrounded me, I became completely crazy (…)” 
(Popov 1947: 286, my italics). 
Nevertheless, the shaman’s autobiography becomes more complex when he gives 
his own version of the story. A contemporary Tuvan shaman like Khovalygmaa says 
that at her birth a shaman told her that she would be “a great person”. Khovalygmaa 
remembers that when she was a child she had visions but the object of this special 
perception remains undefined in her story. This means that she had a perceptual 
disposition but not a stable relation with special agents. Things became clearer after 
an episode where she ran after a rainbow and fell unconscious. This event, typical for 
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Tuvan shamanic autobiographies, introduces chance into the narrative. When she was 
16, she had a crisis which lasted six months. Her family considered her ill and sent 
her to the hospital. But when she recalls this period from a personal point of view, she 
describes regular visions and meetings with a spirit, an albys. In this Tuvan tradition, 
albys is a category of spirits whose members live in deserted places and who try to 
seduce passers-by. Khovalygmaa explains that her crisis lasted only six months because 
she was virgin. This suggests an erotic relationship with the albys. 
Is the Khovalygmaa’s story in contradiction with the genetic essentialist model? 
In reality, it is not at all contradictory, because after examination a skilful shaman 
established that the albys which Khovalygmaa saw was in fact her great-grandmother 
Samdan, a famous shaman. Then everybody understood that the albys is the chajaan-dös 
or “destiny-root” of the girl. Hence, all attempts to ritually chase the spirit away were 
considered futile. Today Khovalygmaa claims that she is the heiress of Samdan and that 
she receives her help in her shamanic work. 
Thus the social (non-causal) relationship which seemed to be fortuitously estab-
lished with an unknown spirit was in fact an internal and natural relationship between 
a granddaughter and her ancestor. In this narrative, like in most shamanic autobiogra-
phies, the necessary laws of heredity at first take the appearance of luck and election. 
Even if a specific shamanic speech register emphasizes the relational aspect in contrast 
with the layman narratives which are more essentialist, in all cases, natural qualities 
are attributed to shamans in their childhood. However, this difference of discursive 
practices is indicative of most social interactions. The relational style of shamans’ inter-
pretations involving special agents lends a repeated concrete evidence to the hypothesis 
of perceptive capacity of shamans and thus consequently reinforces the principle of a 
natural difference between shamans and laymen.
Original by nature
However, a series of facts challenge the idea that the category of shaman is 
conceived of as a species or a natural kind, possessing an inner essence. Today, the 
majority of Tuvan shamans are working in religious associations and external observers 
have concluded that Tuvan shamanism has become ‘institutionalised’ and ‘stabilised’ 
(Halemba 2003). It is tempting to state that Tuvan shamanism, in Weberian terms, 
evolved from the magician ideal-type to the priest ideal-type. However, in reality, 
extended observation shows that shamans frequently leave one legal association for 
another, open new associations or begin to work independently. Perpetual conflicts 
between shamans take the form of gossip, brawls and lawsuits. Indeed shamans are 
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rivals: each shaman has their own clients who follow them from one association to 
another. The instability of shamanic institutions is extreme and these institutions do 
not provide a standardized ritual service – factors which are required by the Weberian 
definition of a clergy. Rather than ‘clerical corporations’, Tuvan shamanic associa-
tions are better described as competing service providers, companies trying to attract 
shamans, bringing their own clientele with them. Thus, the sociological appearance of 
unification should not hide the real independence of Tuvan shamans.
However, most ordinary Tuvans, especially in the countryside, judge such ‘unions’ 
of shamans with an absolute disapproval. They maintain that shamans who work in 
such places are necessarily false shamans. For them, holding a shamanic essence is 
contrary to collective activity. The shaman Kim Ondum who lives in the village of 
Erzin explained to me in 2002 the reasons for his refusal to work in an association: “In 
the past, shamans killed each other. Shamanic associations are not correct. Amongst 
them, there are charlatans: charlatan are copiers. Nobody teaches how to become a 
shaman. When I was 8, I already heard. Real shamans have different characteristics and 
they handle their capacity differently. On the contrary, false shamans copy each other.” 
The statement that “shamans are different, they eat each other” (khamnar chizhip turar), 
was often repeated by laymen in the countryside. 
Such an idea explicitly contradicts the conception of the category of shaman as 
being on a par with a biological species, because members of the same species cannot 
eat each other. Of course Tuvans know that shamans belong to the human species, but 
when they look at them as shamans, they see them as unique specimen of an original 
species. They even expect hostility from them, which may lead to the eating of rivals. 
I was told that in order to be a “great shaman” (ulug kham), one must have eaten four-
teen other shamans. 
Shamans’ constant efforts to satisfy this expectation is evidence that they are 
universally shared amongst Tuvans. Even among urban shamanic associations, each 
shaman wears an original costume, uses specific talismans and sings personal songs. 
This tendency to diversity is not a consequence of the introduction of a “modern” 
representation of the person. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Norwegian 
traveller Olsen noted that “the details of the costume vary depending on the resources 
and individual taste of each magician” (1921: 152). The Germano-Russian academic 
Georgi noted in the 18th century that “often the shamans from one people vary in their 
ceremonial” (1776-1777, III: 152). This opinion was shared by the local population 
itself: Potanin noted that amongst the Altaians “…the action is variable, the songs 
are variable, and the divinities which shamans address are also variable” (1883: 62). I 
often heard such ideas expressed by Tuvans. The shaman Khovalygmaa said that each 
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shaman beats the drum in a personal manner. Every Tuvan shaman claims that his 
invocations are unique and that they vary at each séance. They say that they cannot 
remember invocations because they are not the product of their memory. A shaman 
who repeats the same stereotypical formulas is suspected of acting of his own volition 
and therefore cannot be compelled to do so by natural necessity. 
Likewise, the shamanic costume is assumed somehow to be a special extension of 
the shaman’s ordinary body. Thus, each shaman is expected to possess a costume, origi-
nal in its shade, detail and style. My interpretation is that the instability of shamanic 
associations described above and the eternal conflicts between their members are a 
direct consequence of this general expectation of difference between shamans. This 
finding is not a peculiarity to Siberian peoples. In his own fieldwork accounts, Boyer 
gives empirical evidences that suggest very similar conceptions. The Fang in Gabon 
have ritual specialists called ngengang who have their individual techniques, their spir-
its and their own explanation for their activities, and laymen are aware of this idiosyn-
cratic nature. “Dans la mesure où leur rôle dépend essentiellement de leurs qualités 
individuelles, de leur réputation dans un groupe particulier, ils ne sont pas clairement 
perçus comme les représentants d’une façon de faire généralisée” (2001: 393). 
Given these individual traits, it would appear difficult to maintain that there is 
a commonality between the causal processes attributed to a ‘species essence’, which 
make a giraffe a giraffe, and the causal effects expected from a ritual specialist essence. 
Members of a species are expected to manifest common behaviour and specific proper-
ties caused by a shared essence. On the contrary, Fang laymen consult different ngen-
gang because they expect them to have different kinds of powers. Differences are so 
strong, that the Fang do not always recognised the ngengang as sharing a common set 
of ritual activities. It seems clear that the species model is not helpful in this domain. 
Ritual specialists are not supposed to possess a common essence but an individual one. 
As an expression of this individuality, ngengang essences, called evur, are understood to 
be so different that people think that in some cases they cannot be in close proximity 
with each other. The meeting of two evur can cause the outbreak of a disease (Boyer 
1990: 32). This conception is similar to the belief amongst Tuvans that the illness of 
a shaman is usually caused by an attack by another shaman. 
At this point, it becomes clear that some notional distinctions are necessary. 
Statements about a category can apply either to the category as a whole or to the 
members included in the category. When anthropologists attribute essentialist assump-
tions about a category, does it mean that the category is seen as a homogeneous object, 
a whole, determined by an essential cause, or that each of its members is supposed to 
have an internal essence, possibly an individual one? This point is usually not taken into 
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consideration. This problem has recently been explored from another perspective by 
psychologists. Studies in social psychology seem to be less attractive for anthropologists 
than theories in cognitive psychology. The social psychological tradition is closer to social 
sciences, but this maybe the very reason for its lack of attraction to anthropologists.
However, social psychologists have a long experience of studying representations 
of social groups. In 1958, Campbell introduced the notion of ‘entitativity’, i.e. the 
degree to which a collection is conceived as a homogeneous entity. Since the article by 
Medin and Ortony (1989) on the notion of “psychological essentialism”, a wide range 
of experimental research has documented ontological assumptions about social catego-
ries. Social psychologists have been predominantly interested in implicit theories that 
support stereotypes and their consequences for discrimination (concerning gender, 
ethnicity and sexual orientation). Haslam and his colleagues (2000) have shown, by a 
test on undergraduate Americans, the necessity to distinguish between two different 
principles operating in essentialist judgements: naturalism (members belong to the 
category by nature) and entitativity (the category is reified, i.e. seen as a homogenous 
whole). These two principles vary independently and have different practical conse-
quences. In particular, the authors have shown that high status categories are judged 
highly natural but poorly entitative. Thus, whites and males are naturalized but 
not reified. Conversely, categories which are both naturalized and reified, like Jews, 
women and blacks, tend to be stigmatized. Denson and his colleagues confirmed that 
entitativity varies independently of natural essentialism: they found that judgements 
about task groups and intimacy group present a high entitativity but only the latter 
is naturalized (Denson et al 2006). Consequently Haslam and his colleagues criticized 
the interpretations that treat essentialist judgements as a homogenous way of thought. 
They claimed that “…theorists must be careful not to obscure the distinction” 
between naturalism and entitativity. Quoting Rothbart & Taylor, Atran and Boyer, 
they criticize the fact that the authors “…have treated essentialism as equivalent to 
the understanding of social categories as natural kinds (…) or to the misapplication of 
folk-biological principles to human kinds” (Haslam et al 2000: 123).
Biological species are the object of essentialist assumptions which are both 
maximally naturalist and entitative. Judgements about ritual specialists are likewise 
deeply naturalist, but they are also characterized by a particularly weak entitativity. 
This difference renders non-relevant the assumption that biological species and social 
categories, such as ritual specialists, are processed by a unique cognitive device. This 
argument supports Gelman and Hirschfeld (1999) in their hypothesis that the human 
mind distinguishes naturally between biological and social categories, and that these 
categories are characterised by domain-specific and relatively isolated principles.
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Groups that are understood as highly entitative are more subject to inductive 
judgements, often negatively oriented (Schadron 2006). Theorists say that they hold a 
higher “inductive potential”. Therefore, one can expect to find stereotyped generalisa-
tions of different kinds about groups which are conceived entitatively. Indeed, Tuvans 
judge that there are few relevant differences within Mongols (entitativity) and they 
often express negative statements judging Mongols as perfidious and curse casters. 
Reciprocally, Mongols say that Tuvans are khara nomtaj ulus “black doctrine people” 
i.e. “sorcerers” (Potanin 1883: 189 n.1). In a recent inquiry in Mongolia (2001), the 
anthropologist Gil-White found that Mongols process ethnic groups, such as Tuvan 
and Kazakh, as natural living kinds (something which I argue is debatable), and that 
a common predictable behaviour is attributed to their members (something that is 
consistent with my observations from the other side of the border). 
In areas where they have survived, inter-clans distinctions exhibit a no less induc-
tive potential. In 19th century, Potanin collected numerous proverbial statements 
repeated by Altaians about clans which they don’t belong to (1883: 2-10). For exam-
ple, Mundus clan members were called “thousand fools” (muŋ alu). Still nowadays, 
people say that members of the Todosh clan (söök) have an extremely good appetite and 
that the Kergil are greedy (Kudachinova 2006: 208). General statements of this kind, 
referring to the category of shamans, are quite rare. Caroline Humphrey, gathering 
information about Daur shamans, notes how she “… realized that people rarely talked 
about them as a category. They were remembered as individuals” (Humphrey & Onon 
[1996] 2003: 183). The unique kind of proverbs that I found about shamans describes 
their position in a system rather than their personality. In their Khakass and Altaian 
variants, such proverbs maintain, with a kind of cynicism, that: “When the livestock is 
ill, the dog is well-fed; when the man is ill, the shaman is well-fed”. One can find other 
similar proverbs in Tuvan, which clearly serve to criticise “false shamans”. It appears 
that false shamans are thought as highly entitative (“they are all the same”) and poorly 
natural (“they decided themselves to practice shamanism”).
Instead, Tuvans do not speak in general terms about what constitutes the “genuine 
shamans”, except to maintain that they are different. That is not to say that discourse 
about shamans in the oral traditions of the region is rare, it merely deviates from the 
forms of eternal rules encapsulated in proverbs (in Tuvan proverb is called üleger domak 
“model sentence”). Numerous concrete stories (in Tuvan chugaa “statement”) concern-
ing ancestors and famous local shamans, contribute to the spread of such conceptions 
of shamans. These narratives stabilize the model of transmission, development and 
identification of the shamanic essence. Thus, the cognitive principles driving concrete 
inferences about shamans remain an implicit scheme without explicit general rules. 
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Shamans are naturalized and essentialized, but this essentialism is domain-specific: 
shamans are not essentialized in an species way, because their category is not reified.
Shaman as relational concept?
Another argument against the species way of essentialism lies in the possibility of 
“shaman” to be a relational concept for Tuvans, such as “brother” or “wife”. It is logi-
cally impossible to be a brother alone, or to be a wife without husband: is it possible 
to be a shaman without laymen? This question is not empirical, the problem is: does 
the idea of a shaman not imply in itself the existence of laymen? The internal relation 
that links categories is not specific to kinship terms, such as brother. The philosopher 
Vincent Descombes emphasized the fact that relations between social statuses are 
firstly internal or logical ones, before being empirical. Indeed, master and slave imply 
each other. 
It can be objected that some statuses, that are thought as statuses, have their basis 
in personal quality, that is itself thought as natural. For example, we assume that the 
prestigious status of an honest running champion is founded in physical capacities and 
not in his social relationships, for instance with the jury. Likewise, we have seen that 
the status of the shaman is founded in embodied faculties. However, Tuvans’ stereotyp-
ical definition of shamans determines these properties in relational terms. Even before 
his accession to the status, one says about the novice that “he sees what simple people 
cannot see, he hears what simple people cannot hear.” Yet, what is a “simple man” 
(bödüün kizhi)? Usually he is considered to be a man who “cannot do what a shaman 
does” because “he cannot see what a shaman sees”. In other words, ‘simple man’ and 
‘shaman’ logically imply one another in their definitions. This internal relation make 
a complete difference with the biological species, which do not necessarily have to be 
understood in relational terms, but can be conceived independently one from another. 
Of course, the predator needs its prey to survive, however, this necessity is not a logical 
one but empirical. Nothing prevents us from understanding the situation of a preda-
tor species surviving despite the disappearance of its usual prey; on the contrary, it is 
difficult to conceive the meaning of being a “shaman” in a society in which people are 
not disposed to define themselves as “simple people”. That is why the “shamans” of 
new-age associations in Western societies find themselves in a strange position of self-
proclaimed kings without subjects. 
The evidence in support of essentialist assumptions about a category does not 
imply that this category is thought exclusively in essentialist terms. Kalish (2002) 
found that categories are often essentialized only to some degree depending on the 
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purpose of the category user. It is important to note that some categories can both 
have naturalist principles and relational aspects: it suffices to think of the categories 
such as “young” and “old”. Membership of the “old” category is obviously founded in 
physical characteristics, however it is necessary to conceive of other humans who are 
not old, i.e. other categories, in order to conceive of members of the category “old”. 
Such cases indicate that concepts concerning human categories tend to constitute an 
inter-relational system.
To take another example, Dumont demonstrated that, even if the Indian casts are 
called jati, which means “species”, the impurity of the untouchable is conceptually 
inseparable from the purity of Brahman. In other words, casts participate in a relational 
system and not in a racist or substantialist ideology (Dumont 1966: 77). A strictly 
essentialist understanding of a relational concept is not an original interpretation 
but a miscomprehension of its meaning. If an individual assumes that it is possible 
to be husband without wife, it does not mean that his worldview is essentialist; the 
only conclusion is that he is not a competent user of his language. I argue that it is 
just the same with the idea of shaman (kam/kham) that, for Turkic-Siberian languages 
users, implies the notion of laymen (bödüün kizhi “simple people”, anaa kizhi “ordinary 
people” or kara kizhi “black people”). 
Conclusion
The shaman case demonstrates the necessity of distinguishing between judgements 
about social categories that apply to its members and those that apply to the category 
as a whole. In this respect, the notions of naturalisation and entitativity are useful. To 
assume that a being belongs to a category by nature does not necessarily mean that the 
category itself is thought to be a homogeneous entity. The common property of the 
members of a category can be precisely “originality”, which implies that the category is 
heteroclite in itself, constituting an abstract class but not a corporate group. Shamans 
are understood as such: as being naturally (by unintentional process) original. It is 
difficult to identify logically coherent sets of statements as a definitional basis for such 
a category. That, however, does not mean that laypeople do not have certain expecta-
tions when they hear that someone is a shaman. People share schematic representations 
drawing on formal patterns for shamans’ development and behaviour. However, the 
content of the pattern is necessarily idiosyncratic; in other words, shamanic personal 
style is expected to be unexpected. 
Contrary to the biological species model, shamanic essence is understood as a 
differentiating power. Cognitive anthropology sees its aim as the study of the formal 
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structures of representations. This allowed to Boyer to emphasize counter-intuitiveness 
as a universal formal feature of religious concepts. The aim is, so to say, to radiography 
judgments and inferences in order to show the basic universal structure of the mind 
which constrains them regardless of their content. Indeed, from a very formal point 
of view, the representations of biological species and of ritual specialists as categories 
have similarities. Yet, puzzling discrepancies appear concerning homogeneity of the 
category members and of their development. Only an examination of the content 
of judgments can make it possible to understand theses differences in expectations 
concerning shamans’ originality. 
To conclude, a group judged with a low entitativity, such as the category of 
shamans, is understood with the help of an implicit scheme that unites coherent 
hypotheses about the development and behaviour of its members. To test this predic-
tion, future research should be carried out on other cases of categories, understood 
with high naturalness and low entitativity, such as nobles, poets and geniuses. One 
of the consequences of cognitive postulates, such as semantic atomism and naturalisa-
tion of the mental, is a repeated attempt to discover specialized inference engines or 
“modules”. These philosophical principles lead to a partitioned mapping of the mind, 
maladjusted to the relational character of social concepts and cultural representations. 
The attribution of a degree of naturalness to some social categories should not hide the 
fact that people think not only in terms of categories but also in terms of social rela-
tionships between them. Additionally, the modular theory cannot explain the fact that, 
depending on pragmatic contexts, people freely treat the same category through differ-
ent models and prefer thus a more essentialist or a more structural point of view. 
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Abstract
In Siberia a lot of facts confirm an essentialist interpretation of shamanism: 
frequent distinction between genuine and false shamans, physical particularities, like 
illness, attributed to shamans, absence of initiation, and hereditary mode of transmis-
sion of the ‘shamanic gift’. This seems to draw shamans as individuals stroked by a 
genetic illness, or as members of a peculiar species, either way, biologically different 
individuals. This kind of interpretation was not developed in the main anthropological 
analysis about Siberian shamanism. Cultural interpretations of “shamanic gift” were 
founded on explicit native explanations like myths, tales and narratives of the shamans 
about themselves. Theses narratives link shamanic function with the election of the 
specialist by a supernatural agent, like a spirit. In this way, the shaman takes his power 
not from an internal essence but only from his interaction, often an erotic one, with 
external supernatural agents. Some narratives suggest that if this relationship appears 
to be broken, the shaman may lose his status and even be killed by his group. Indeed, 
the essentialist interpretation contrasts with numerous ethnographic descriptions in 
the world, even from Boyer himself, which underlines the relational foundation of 
religious competency. Nevertheless, I argue that no one of those theses can be entirely 
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rejected, and the apparent contradiction can be resolved if we take into account the 
contexts and different kinds of speech in which these models are actualized. One could 
say that some kinds of interaction favour cognitivist speech and others structuralist 
speech. This study is based on new fieldwork material from Tuva (South Siberia).
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